Morocco’s pre-protectorate diplomacy and its links to its western alignment during the cold war.

Morocco has been a member of the non-aligned movement since its year of foundation. However, unlike many non-aligned countries, Morocco showed a clear inclination to the west in many instances. The most well known of them being the sand war of 1963, which saw a western-backed morocco, fight a war against two non-aligned countries: Algeria, and Cuba themselves backed by Egypt. Other examples of such policy, can be the existence of American military bases in Morocco, such as the bases in Ben Guerir, and Kenitra. This diplomatic switch to the west is a surprising event for a non-aligned country, and many historians trace it to the interactions that the kingdom of Morocco had with western powers during or before the protectorate. But historians disagree with the nature of such interactions, were they mere imperialistic pressure from the western powers as Lugan would describe them, or were they a more conscious policy of opening to the west, as would be seen by Terrasse. This essay doesn’t only limit itself to the response of the question of the nature of such a diplomatic policy but also seeks to bring clarifications about the extent of the effect it had on the pro-western alignment of Hassan the second’s Morocco. And after analysis of the sources, and further investigation, we came to the conclusion that Morocco’s pre protectorate relations with foreign powers including the US, came more like a crisis response to the end of barbary piracy and didn’t intend to be a strategic alliance thus making it only impact to a small extent the decision undertaken by Hassan II to align the country with the US during the cold war.

It is a common view among historians and orientalists when discussing Morocco’s pro-western alignment is that it started with the policy of opening to the west as operated by the Alaouite monarch Mohammed III, including his recognition of the American independence, and his invitations to many foreign doctors, as well as the opening of consulates (Lempriere, 1801), This policy will culminate in the Peace and Friendship treaty between Morocco, and the United States. This will form Morocco’s sultans to align the empire with western powers, alongside the lasting alliance between the Moroccan cherifs and the US, will make Morocco’s context different from other Arab, and African states, thus explaining its unexpected alignment with the west and its long-lasting American allies rather than fully aligning itself with the Non-Aligned Movement.

However, a counterclaim to that would be that the move towards more open relations with Europe, was mostly started by the need to turn the page of the maritime jihad, and so especially during the reign of the alaouite monarch Mohammed III (Kitlas. 2015). Seen from this perspective Morocco’s opening to the external world in the pre-protectorate period, would be more related to the specific issues that affected post barbary wars in north Africa (Woodward.2004). Thus, separating it from a genuine intention from morocco’s part to align itself with other European powers, and putting it more in the context of the decline in the strength of the Barbary states. Thus using these reasons to justify Morocco’s pro-western alignment during the cold-war would be irrelevant, as they happened in a context that can’t be linked to the political context of Hassan II Morocco.

A parallel view to that is that the Moroccan choice of alignment has to be put in the context, of the reform of Morocco’s political and ideological structure undertaken partly by Mohammed V and mostly by his successor Hassan II. This position is supported by two main arguments:

The first parameter to be considered when analyzing Morocco’s foreign policy during the protectorate era is that according to the treaty of Fez of 1912: Article VI The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests abroad. His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of an international nature without the previous approval of the French Republic. This means that Morocco during that period was unable to engage in any independent foreign policy. However, this rule will be bypassed in many instances, especially after the German occupation of France, this will start a period labelled as “The Franco-Moroccan conflict of 1943–1956” (Rivlin, 1984), this will first manifest itself after the Anfa meeting between Mohammed V and Franklin. D Roosevelt. This meeting will mark a new start for Morocco, as it will come back in the international scene, proving itself to be more than a French colony, but almost a sovereign Nation under the rule of its Monarch, the sultan (Rivlin, 1984). However, this move from the United States will not represent an official state policy and will stay a mere “personal position” by president Roosevelt, yet it will mark a change as for the first time a foreign power will emphasize Morocco’s sovereignty since Wilhelm II’s visit to Tangiers. Hence by being backed by the US in their assertion of Independence during WWII and later, post-Protectorate Morocco will align itself with the US, in continuation of this strategic alliance, while the US from its part will continue this alliance to protect its influence in Gibraltar strait, and the Maghreb, especially considering the many American military bases established in Morocco during the protectorate such as the one established in Kenitra on the year 1942.

A final perspective on Morocco’s alignment with the US takes it furthermore from the question of its pre protectorate and protectorate era international relations and links it to Morocco’s governmental structure, as well as its internal troubles first. Indeed, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Morocco was and still is a conservative Islamic monarchy which values didn’t match with the set of values shared by countries in the eastern bloc, nor with the set of ‘liberal’ values shared by the western bloc, thus pushing Morocco to the Non-aligned bloc. However, conflict with the third-worldist left represented by the “unfp”, that will represent a severe threat to the Moroccan monarchy prior to the years of lead under Hassan II (Lugan, 2011), as well as conflict with the soviet backed neighbouring Algeria, and Cuba, will further push Morocco into the hands of the western alliance, although Morocco will not join NATO, and will on paper still be considered a non-aligned country. Moreover, Morocco isn’t really the exception in this case, as similar cases of Arab monarchies turning themselves to the west have been seen with the case of Saudi Arabia, Koweit, and the UAE.

From all the perspectives shown and discussed above, we can notice all the complexity of this issue, this has to do with many factors, the most important of which is the focus that the author sets to himself, thus we notice that some arguments tend to see it more from a global political perspective, while others instead focus more on the internal situation in morocco whether prior to the protectorate, or later on as an independent country to bring elements of the response. It seems clear to me that these two perspectives are valuable if put both together and both in their respective contexts. Trying to understand Morocco’s pre-protectorate era through the lenses of International relations would be futile as the country at that period was weakened by internal conflicts and engaged in a policy of self-isolation, thus making its foreign policy ununderstandable to any historian that ignores such context. In parallel as Morocco lost control over much of its foreign policy under the rule of the protectorate, understanding its foreign policy can be done only through understanding France’s political ambitions. Thus it seems that these perspectives although seemingly contradictory, actually complement each other, by bringing more elements of response to the original question. Thus the fact that post protectorate Morocco aligned itself with the western Bloc has to do with all the reasons cited above with various levels of importance, with the most recent ones being more influential on that decision, as Morocco experienced a new start in its foreign policy after the protectorate as discussed before. The Moroccan-American alliance of 1787 is more of a historical anecdote, that has been used as a way to legitimize Morocco’s cold war alignment, rather than an actual cause for it.

Sources:

Rivlin, Benjamin. “The United States and Moroccan International Status, 1943–1956: A Contributory Factor in Morocco’s Reassertion of Independence from France.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 1982, p. 64., DOI:10.2307/218449.

Woodward, G. Thomas. “The Costs of State–Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates.” National Tax Journal, vol. 57, no. 3, 2004, pp. 599–611., doi:10.17310/ntj.2004.3.07.

Kitlas. “Al-Miknāsīs Mediterranean Mission: Negotiating Moroccan Temporal and Spiritual Sovereignty in the Late Eighteenth Century.” Mediterranean Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, 2015, p. 170., doi:10.5325/mediterraneanstu.23.2.0170.

Lempriere, William, and Sainte-Suzanne .. Voyage Dans L’empire De Maroc. 1801.

The American-Moroccan Peace and Friendship treaty of 1786

The treaty of Fez 1912

Lugan, Bernard. Histoire Du Maroc. Ellipses, 2011. p. 328

Terrasse, Henri. Histoire Du Maroc: Des Origines à létablissement Du Protectorat français. AMS Press, 1975.